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ABSTRACT
We study a general task allocation problem, involving mul-
tiple agents that collaboratively accomplish tasks and where
agents may fail to successfully complete the tasks assigned
to them (known as execution uncertainty). The goal is to
choose an allocation that maximises social welfare while tak-
ing their execution uncertainty into account (i.e., fault tol-
erant). To achieve this, we show that the post-execution
verification (PEV)-based mechanism presented by Porter et
al. (2008) is applicable if and only if agents’ valuations are
risk-neutral (i.e., the solution is almost universal). We then
consider a more advanced setting where an agent’s execution
uncertainty is not completely predictable by the agent alone
but aggregated from all agents’ private opinions (known as
trust). We show that PEV-based mechanism with trust is
still applicable if and only if the trust aggregation is multi-
linear. Given this characterisation, we further demonstrate
how this mechanism can be successfully applied in a real-
world setting. Finally, we draw the parallels between our
results and the literature of efficient mechanism design with
general interdependent valuations.
CCS Concepts
•Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism
design; •Computing methodologies → Multi-agent
systems;
Keywords
Execution uncertainty; interdependent valuations; type ver-
ification; trust aggregation
1. INTRODUCTION
We study a general task allocation problem, where multiple
agents collaboratively accomplish a set of tasks. However,
agents may fail to successfully complete the task(s) allo-
cated to them (known as execution uncertainty). Such task
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allocation problems arise in many real-world applications
such as transportation networks [17], data routing [16], cloud
computing [1] and the sharing economy [2]. Execution un-
certainty is typically unavoidable in these applications due
to unforeseen events and limited resources, especially shar-
ing economy applications such as Uber and Freelancer.com,
where services are mostly provided by individuals with no
qualifications or certifications.
In addition to the execution uncertainty underlying the
task allocation problem, the completion of a task may also
depend on the completion of other tasks, e.g., in Uber a
rider cannot travel without a driver offering the ride. The
completion of the tasks of an allocation gives a (private)
value to each agent, and our goal is to choose an allocation
of tasks that maximises the total value of all agents, while
taking their execution uncertainty into account.
It has been shown that traditional mechanism design (based
on Groves mechanisms [5]) is not applicable to settings that
involve execution uncertainty [14, 4]. This is because ex-
ecution uncertainty implies interdependencies between the
agents’ valuations (e.g., a rider’s value for a ride will largely
depend on whether the driver will successfully finish the
drive). To combat this problem, Porter et al. [14] have pro-
posed a solution based on post-execution verification (PEV),
which is broadly aligned with type verification [11]. The key
idea behind the PEV-based mechanism is that agents are
paid according to their task executions (i.e., whether they
complete their tasks or not), rather than what they have
reported.
While Porter et al. [14] considered a single task requester
setting where one requester has multiple tasks that can be
completed by multiple workers, Stein et al. [18] and Conizter
and Vidali [4] studied similar settings but considering work-
ers’ uncertain task execution time. Moreover, Ramchurn et
al. [15] looked at a more complex setting where each agent
is a task requester and is also capable of completing some
tasks for the others. Apart from considering different set-
tings, all the solutions in these studies are PEV-based. How-
ever, these results may not apply to other different problem
settings where, for example, agents’ valuations may have ex-
ternalities, e.g., agent A prefers working with B instead of
others [7], and an agent may even incur some costs with-
out doing any task, e.g., when a government builds a costly
public good [8].
Therefore, in this paper, we study a general task alloca-
tion setting where agents’ valuations are not constrained (as
in previous works). Under this general setting, we charac-
terise the applicability of the PEV-based mechanism. Our
contributions advance the state of the art in the following
ways:
• We propose a generalisation of the work of Porter et
al. [14] and Ramchurn et al. [15]: (1) Both [14] and [15]
showed that PEV-based mechanisms are ex-post truth-
fully implementable in their limited settings, while this
paper shows that PEV-based mechanisms are ex-post
truthful for all risk-neutral settings (with or without
externalities). (2) Ramchurn et al. [15] further showed
that PEV-based mechanisms are also ex-post truthful
in a trust-based environment with linear trust aggre-
gation, while this paper shows that truthfulness still
holds for a much wider class of trust aggregations,
namely all multilinear aggregations.
• We also bound the applicability of the PEV-based mech-
anisms by showing that risk-neutral valuations and
multilinear aggregations are also necessary conditions
for achieving ex-post truthfulness. This bound has
never been shown in any valuation setting before.
• Given the above characterisation, we demonstrate how
this mechanism can be successfully applied in the real-
world. We consider ridesharing as an example, where
people may have very complex preferences for sharing
with others (i.e., externalities exist naturally).
• Since our problem setting is essentially an interdepen-
dent valuation setting, we also draw the parallels be-
tween our results and the literature of efficient mecha-
nism design with interdependent valuations, which fur-
ther demonstrates the significance of the PEV-based
mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the general task allocation model. Section 3
introduces the PEV-based mechanism and characterises its
applicability. We then extend the characterisation to trust-
based environments in Section 4 and show a promising appli-
cation example in Section 5. Lastly, we compare our results
to the literature of efficient design with general interdepen-
dent valuations.
2. THE MODEL
We study a task allocation problem where there are n agents
denoted by N = {1, ..., n} and a finite set of task allocations
T 1 (e.g., rides to ride-sharers or packages to delivery trucks).
Each allocation τ ∈ T is defined by τ = (τi)i∈N , where τi is a
set of tasks assigned to agent i. Let τi = ∅ if there is no task
assigned to i in τ . For each allocation τ , agent i may fail to
successfully complete her tasks τi, which is modelled by p
τ
i ∈
[0, 1], the probability that i will successfully complete her
tasks τi. Let pi = (p
τ
i )τ∈T be i’s probability of success
(PoS) profile for all allocations T , and pτ = (pτi )i∈N be the
PoS profile of all agents for allocation τ .
Note that the completion of one task in an allocation may
depend on the completion of the other tasks. Take the de-
livery example in Figure 1 with two agents 1, 2 delivering
one package from S to D. There are two possible task allo-
cations to finish the delivery: τ is collaboratively executed
1T is the task allocation outcome space, which may contain
all feasible task allocations (with or without redundancy)
that agents can execute. The precise definition depends on
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τ
i )τ∈T be i’s probability of success
(PoS) profile for all allocations T , and pτ = (pτi )i∈N be the
PoS profile of all agents for allocation τ .
Note that the completion of one task in an allocation may
depend on the completion of the other tasks. Take the de-
livery example in Figure 1 with two agents 1, 2 delivering
one package from S to D. There are two possible task allo-
cations to finish the delivery: τ is collaboratively executed
by agents 1 and 2, while τ ′ is done by agent 2 alone. It is
clear that task τ2 depends on τ1. However, p
τ
2 only indicates
2’s PoS for τ2, assuming that 1 will successfully complete τ1.
1T is the task allocation outcome space, which may contain
all feasible task allocations (with or without redundancy)
tha agents can execute. The precise definition depe ds on
th applications.
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Figure 1: Package delivery from S to D with two
agents 1, 2
agent allocation pi vi
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Table 1: A valuation setting for the exmaple in Fig-
ure 1
That is, pτi does not include task dependencies and it only
specifies i’s probability to successfully complete τi, if τi is
ready for i to execute.
For each allocation τ ∈ T , the completion of τ brings each
agent i a value (either positive or negative), which combines
costs and benefits. For example, oﬀering a ride to someone in
ridesharing may incur a detour cost to the driver, but it may
also bring both the driver and the rider a valuable journey.
Considering the execution uncertainty, agent i’s valuation is
modelled by a function vi : T × [0, 1]N → R, which assigns a
value to each allocation τ , for each PoS profile pτ = (pτi )i∈N .
For each agent i, we assume that vi and pi are privately ob-
served by i, known as i’s type and denoted by θi = (vi, pi).
Let θ = (θi)i∈N be the type profile of all agents, θ−i be the
type profile of all agents except i, and θ = (θi, θ−i). Let Θi
be i’s type space, Θ = (Θi)i∈N and Θ−i = (Θj)j ̸=i∈N .
Given the above setting, our goal is to choose one task al-
location from T that maximises all agents’ valuations, i.e., a
socially optimal allocation. This can be achieved (according
to the revelation principle [10]) by designing a mechanism
that directly asks all agents to report their types and then
chooses an allocation maximising their valuations. However,
agents may not report their types truthfully. Therefore, we
need to incentivize them to reveal their true types, which is
normally achieved by choosing a specific allocation of tasks
and an associated monetary transfer to each agent. The di-
rect revelation allocation mechanism is defined by a task
allocation choice function π : Θ → T and a payment
function x = (x1, ..., xn) where xi : Θ → R is the payment
function for agent i.
2.1 Solution Concepts
The goal of the allocation mechanism is to choose a task
allocation that maximises the valuation of all agents, i.e., the
social welfare. Since the agents’ types are privately observed
by the agents, the mechanism is only able to maximise social
welfare if it can receive their true types. Therefore, the
mechanism needs to incentivize all agents to report their
types truthfully. Moreover, agents should not lose when
they participate in the task allocation mechanism, i.e., they
are not forced to join the allocation. In the following, we
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by agents 1 and 2, while τ ′ is done by agent 2 alone. It is
clear that task τ2 depends on τ1. However, p
τ
2 only indicates
2’s PoS for τ2, assuming that 1 will successfully complete τ1.
That is, pτi does not include task dependencies and it only
specifies i’s probability to successfully complete τi, if τi is
ready for i to execute.
For each allocation τ ∈ T , the completion of τ brings each
agent i a value (either positive or negative), which combines
costs and benefits. For example, offering a ride to someone in
ridesharing may incur a detour cost to the driver, but it may
also bring both the driver and the rider a valuable journey.
Considering the execution uncertainty, agent i’s valuation is
modelled by a function vi : T × [0, 1]N → R, which assigns a
value to each allocation τ , for each PoS profile pτ = (pτi )i∈N .
For each agent i, we assume that vi and pi are privately ob-
served by i, known as i’s type and denoted by θi = (vi, pi).
Let θ = (θi)i∈N be the type profile of all agents, θ−i be the
type profile of all agents except i, and θ = (θi, θ−i). Let Θi
be i’s type space, Θ = (Θi)i∈N and Θ−i = (Θj)j 6=i∈N .
Given the above setting, our goal is to choose one task al-
location from T that maximises all agents’ valuations, i.e., a
socially optimal allocation. This can be achieved (according
to the revelation principle [10]) by designing a mechanism
that directly asks all agents to report their types and then
chooses an allocation maximising their valuations. However,
agents may not report their types truthfully. Therefore, we
need to incentivize them to reveal their true types, which is
normally achieved by choosing a specific allocation of tasks
and an associated monetary transfer to each agent. The di-
rect revelation allocation mechanism is defined by a task
allocation choice function pi : Θ → T and a payment
function x = (x1, ..., xn) where xi : Θ → R is the payment
function for agent i.
2.1 Solution Concepts
The goal of the allocation mechanism is to choose a task
allocation that maximises the valuation of all agents, i.e., the
social welfare. Since the agents’ types are privately observed
by the agents, the mechanism is only able to maximise social
welfare if it can receive their true types. Therefore, the
mechanism needs to incentivise all agents to report their
types truthfully. Moreover, agents should not lose when
they participate in the task allocation mechanism, i.e., they
are not forced to join the allocation. In the following, we
formally define these concepts.
We say an allocation choice pi is efficient if it always chooses
an allocation that maximises the expected social welfare for
all type report profiles.
Definition 1. Allocation choice pi is efficient if and only
if for all θ ∈ Θ, for all τ ′ ∈ T , let τ = pi(θ), we have:∑
i∈N
vi(τ, p
τ ) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(τ
′, pτ
′
)
where pτ = (pτi )i∈N , and p
τ ′ = (pτ
′
i )i∈N .
Note that the expected social welfare calculated by pi is
based on the agents’ reported types, which are not necessar-
ily their true types. However, agents’ actual/realized valua-
tion for an allocation only depends on their true types.
Given the agents’ true type profile θ, their reported type
profile θˆ and the allocation mechanism (pi, x), agent i’s ex-
pected utility is quasilinear and defined as:
ui(θi, pi(θˆ), xi(θˆ), p
pi(θˆ)) = vi(pi(θˆ), p
pi(θˆ))− xi(θˆ),
where ppi(θˆ) = (p
pi(θˆ)
i )i∈N is agents’ true PoS profile for task
pi(θˆ) and pˆpi(θˆ) = (pˆ
pi(θˆ)
i )i∈N is what they have reported.
Definition 2. Mechanism (pi, x) is individually ratio-
nal if for all i ∈ N , for all θ ∈ Θ, for all θˆ−i ∈ Θ−i,
ui(θi, pi(θi, θˆ−i), xi(θi, θˆ−i), ppi(θi,θˆ−i)) ≥ 0.
That is, an agent never receives a negative expected utility
in an individually rational mechanism if she reports truth-
fully, no matter what others report.
Furthermore, we say the mechanism is truthful (aka dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible) if it always maximises an agent’s
expected utility if she reports her type truthfully no matter
what the others report, i.e., reporting type truthfully is a
dominant strategy. It has been shown that truthful and effi-
cient mechanism is impossible to achieve in a special settings
of the model [14]. Instead we focus on a weaker solution
concept (but still very valid) called ex-post truthful, which
requires that reporting truthfully maximises an agent’s ex-
pected utility, if everyone else also reports truthfully (i.e.,
reporting truthfully is an ex-post equilibrium).
Definition 3. Mechanism (pi, x) is ex-post truthful if
and only if for all i ∈ N , for all θ ∈ Θ, for all θˆi ∈ Θi, we
have ui(θi, pi(θi, θ−i), xi(θi, θ−i), ppi(θi,θ−i))) ≥
ui(θi, pi(θˆi, θ−i), xi(θˆi, θ−i), ppi(θˆi,θ−i)).
2.2 Failure of the Groves Mechanism
The Groves mechanism is a well-known class of mechanisms
that are efficient and truthful in many domains [5]. How-
ever, they are not directly applicable in our domain due to
the interdependent valuations created by the execution un-
certainty. As we will see later, a simply variation of the
Groves mechanism can solve the problem. In the following,
we briefly introduce the Groves mechanism and show why it
cannot be directly applied.
Given agents’ type report profile θ, Groves mechanisms
compute an efficient allocation pi∗(θ) (pi∗ denotes the effi-
cient allocation choice function) and charge each agent i
xGrovesi (θ) = hi(θ−i)− V−i(θ, pi∗) (1)
where
• hi is a function that only depends on θ−i,
• V−i(θ, pi∗) = ∑j 6=i vj(pi∗(θ), ppi∗(θ)) is the social wel-
fare for all agents, excluding i, under the efficient allo-
cation pi∗(θ).
Since hi is independent of i’s report, we can set hi(θ−i) =
0, and then each agent’s utility is vi(pi
∗(θ)) + V−i(θ, pi∗),
which is the social welfare of the efficient allocation. The
following example shows that the Groves mechanism is not
directly applicable in our task allocation setting.
Take the example from Figure 1 with the setting from
Table 1. If both 1 and 2 report truthfully, the efficient allo-
cation is τ ′ with social welfare 0.5 (which is also their utility
if hi(θ−i) = 0). Now if 1 misreported pˆτ1 > 0.5, then the
efficient allocation will be τ with social welfare pˆτ1 > 0.5,
i.e., 1 can misreport to receive a higher utility.
3. APPLICABILITY OF PEV-BASED MECH-
ANISMS
As shown in the last section, the Groves mechanisms are
not directly applicable due to the interdependency of agents’
valuations created by their probability of success (PoS). The
other reason is that the Groves payment is calculated from
agents’ reported PoS rather than their realized/true PoS.
The fact is that we can partially verify their reported PoS
by delaying their payments until they have executed their
tasks (post-execution verification). In line with this, Porter
et al. [14] have proposed a variation of the Groves mechanism
which pays an agent according to their actual task comple-
tion, rather than what they have reported. More specifically,
we define two payments for each agent: a reward for success-
ful completion and a penalty for non-completion. Let us call
this mechanism PEV-based mechanism.
Porter et al. [14] have considered a simple setting where
there is one requester who has one or multiple tasks to be
allocated to multiple workers each of whom have a fixed cost
to attempt each task. Later, Ramchurn et al. [15] extended
Porter et al.’s model to a multiple-requester setting (a com-
binatorial task exchange) and especially considered trust in-
formation which will be further studied later in this paper.
Our setting generalises both models and allows any types of
valuations and allocations. In what follows, we formally de-
fine the PEV-based mechanism and analyse its applicability
in our general domain.
Given the agents’ true type profile θ and their reports θˆ,
let pτ−i be the true PoS profile of all agents except i for task
τ , pτ = (pτi , p
τ
−i), and pˆ
τ
−i, pˆ
τ be the corresponding reported,
PEV-based payment xPEV for each agent i is defined as:
xPEVi (θˆ) =
{
hi(θˆ−i)− V 1−i(θˆ, pi∗) if i succeeded,
hi(θˆ−i)− V 0−i(θˆ, pi∗) if i failed.
(2)
where
• hi(θˆ−i) =∑j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi∗(θˆ−i), (0, pˆpi∗(θˆ−i)−i )) is the max-
imum expected social welfare that the other agents can
achieve without i’s participation,
• V 1−i(θˆ, pi∗) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
∗(θˆ), (1, ppi
∗(θˆ)
−i )) is the re-
alized expected social welfare of all agents except i un-
der the efficient allocation pi∗(θˆ) when ppi
∗(θˆ)
i = 1, i.e., i
succeeded. V 0−i(θˆ, pi
∗) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
∗(θˆ), (0, ppi
∗(θˆ)
−i ))
is the corresponding social welfare when p
pi∗(θˆ)
i = 0.
Note that hi(θˆ−i) is calculated according to what agents
have reported, while V 1−i(θˆ, pi
∗), V 0−i(θˆ, pi
∗) are based on the
realization of their task completion, which is actually their
true PoS as we used in the calculation. xPEVi pays/rewards
agent i the social welfare increased by i if she completed her
tasks, otherwise penalizes her the social welfare loss due to
her failure.
Porter et al. [14] have shown that the mechanism (pi∗, xPEV )
is ex-post truthful and individually rational if the dependen-
cies between tasks are non-cyclical. In Theorem 1, we show
that (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful in general if agents’ valu-
ations satisfy a multilinearity condition (Definition 4), which
generalizes the non-cyclical task dependencies condition ap-
plied in [14].
Definition 4. Valuation vi of i is multilinear in PoS
if for all type profiles θ ∈ Θ, for all allocations τ ∈ T ,
for all j ∈ N , vi(τ, pτ ) = pτj × vi(τ, (1, pτ−j)) + (1 − pτj ) ×
vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)).
Intuitively, vi is multilinear in PoS if all its variables but
pτj are held constant, vi is a linear function of p
τ
j , which
also means that agent i is risk-neutral (with respect to j’s
execution uncertainty). However, multilinearity in PoS does
not indicate that vi has to be a linear form of vi(τ, p
τ ) =
b + a1p
τ
1 + ... + anp
τ
n, where b, ai are constant (see Table 1
for example).
3.1 Multilinearity in PoS is Sufficient for Truth-
fulness
Theorem 1. Mechanism (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful if
for all i ∈ N , vi is multilinear in PoS.
Proof. According to the characterization of truthful mech-
anisms given by Proposition 9.27 from [13], we need to prove
that for all i ∈ N , for all θ ∈ Θ:
1. xPEVi (θ) does not depend on i’s report, but only on
the task allocation alternatives;
2. i’s utility is maximized by reporting θi truthfully if the
others report θ−i truthfully.
From the definition of xPEVi in (2), we can see that given
the allocation pi∗(θ), agent i cannot change V 1−i(θ, pi
∗) and
V 0−i(θ, pi
∗) without changing the allocation pi∗(θ). Therefore,
xPEVi does not depend on i’s report, but only on the task
allocation outcome pi∗(θ).
In what follows, we show that for each agent i, if the
others report types truthfully, then i’s utility is maximized
by reporting her type truthfully.
Given an agent i’ of type θi and the others’ true type
profile θ−i, assume that i reported θˆi 6= θi. For the al-
location τ = pi∗(θˆi, θ−i), according to xPEVi , when i fi-
nally completes her tasks, i’s utility is u1i = vi(τ, (1, p
τ
−i))−
hi(θ−i)+V 1−i((θˆi, θ−i), pi
∗) and her utility if she fails is u0i =
vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−i)) − hi(θ−i) + V 0−i((θˆi, θ−i), pi∗). Note that i’s
expected valuation depends on her true valuation vi and all
agents’ true PoS. Therefore, i’s expected utility is:
pτi×u1i + (1− pτi )× u0i =
pτi × vi(τ, (1, pτ−i)) (3)
+ (1− pτi )× vi(τ, (0, pτ−i)) (4)
+ pτi
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(τ, (1, p
τ
−i)) (5)
+ (1− pτi )
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(τ, (0, p
τ
−i)) (6)
− hi(θ−i).
Since all valuations are multilinear in PoS, the sum of (3)
and (4) is equal to vi(τ, p
τ ), and the sum of (5) and (6) is∑
j∈N\{i} vj(τ, p
τ ). Thus, the sum of (3), (4), (5) and (6)
is the social welfare under allocation pi∗(θˆi, θ−i). The social
welfare is maximized when i reports truthfully because pi∗
maximizes social welfare (note that this is not the case when
θ−i is not truthfully reported). Moreover, hi(θ−i) is inde-
pendent of i’s report and is the maximum social welfare that
the others can achieve without i. Therefore, by reporting θi
truthfully, i’s utility is maximized.
Theorem 1 shows that multilinearity in PoS is sufficient to
truthfully implement (pi∗, xPEV ) in an ex-post equilibrium
(ex-post truthful), but not in dominant strategies (truthful).
It has been shown in similar settings that ex-post truthful-
ness is the best we can achieve here [14, 15, 18, 4].
3.2 Multilinearity in PoS is also Necessary
In the above we showed that multilinearity in PoS is suffi-
cient for (pi∗, xPEV ) to be ex-post truthful. Here we show
that the multilinearity is also necessary.
Theorem 2. If (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful for all type
profiles θ ∈ Θ, then for all i ∈ N , vi is multilinear in PoS.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that vi of agent of type
θi is not multilinear in PoS, i.e., there exist a θ−i, an alloca-
tion τ ∈ T , and a j ∈ N (without loss of generality, assume
that j 6= i) such that:
vi(τ, p
τ ) 6= pτj × vi(τ, (1, pτ−j)) + (1− pτj )× vi(τ, (0, pτ−j)) (7)
Under the efficient allocation choice function pi∗, it is not
hard to find a type profile θˆ−i such that pi∗(θi, θˆ−i) = τ and
the PoS profile is the same between θ−i and θˆ−i. We can
choose θˆ−i by setting vˆj(τ, pτ ) to a sufficiently large value
for each j 6= i.
Applying (pi∗, xPEV ) on profile (θi, θˆ−i), when j finally
successfully completes her tasks τj , her utility is u
1
j =
vˆj(τ, (1, p
τ
−j)) − hj((θi, θˆ−i)−j) + V 1−j((θi, θˆ−i), pi∗) and her
utility if she fails is u0j = vˆj(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)) − hj((θi, θˆ−i)−j) +
V 0−j((θi, θˆ−i), pi
∗). Thus, j’s expected utility is (note that
pˆτj = p
τ
j ):
pτj×u1j + (1− pτj )× u0j =
pτj × vi(τ, (1, pτ−j)) (8)
+ (1− pτj )× vi(τ, (0, pτ−j)) (9)
+ pτj
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τ, (1, p
τ
−j)) (10)
+ (1− pτj )
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)) (11)
− hj(θ−j).
Given the assumption (7), terms (8) and (9) together can
be written as vi(τ, p
τ ) + δi where δi = (8) + (9)− vi(τ, pτ ).
Similar substitutions can be carried out for all other agents
k ∈ N \ {i} in terms (10) and (11) regardless of whether vk
is mutlilinear in PoS. After this substitution, j’s utility can
be written as:
pj×u1j + (1− pj)× u0j =
vi(τ, p
τ ) +
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τ, p
τ ) (12)
+
∑
k∈N
δk (13)
− hj(θ−j).
Now consider a suboptimal allocation τˆ 6= τ , if τˆ is chosen
by the mechanism, then j’s utility can be written as:
uˆj =
vi(τˆ , p
τˆ ) +
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τˆ , p
τˆ ) (14)
+
∑
k∈N
δˆk (15)
− hj(θ−j).
In the above two utility representations, we know that terms
(12) > (14) because pi∗ is efficient, but terms (13) and (15)
can be any real numbers.
In what follows, we tune the valuation of j such that the
optimal allocation is either τ or τˆ , and in either case j is
incentivized to misreport.
In the extreme case where all agents except i’s valuations
are multilinear in PoS, we have δk = 0, δˆk = 0 for all k 6= i in
(13) and (15). Therefore,
∑
k∈N δk = δi 6= 0 and
∑
k∈N δˆk =
δˆi (possibly = 0). It might be the case that δi = δˆi, but there
must exist a setting where δi 6= δˆi, otherwise vi is multilinear
in PoS, because constant δi for any PoS does not violate the
multilinearity definition.
1. If δi > δˆi, we have (12) + δi > (14) + δˆi. In this case,
we can increase vˆj(τˆ , p
τˆ ) such that τˆ becomes optimal,
i.e., (12) < (14), but (12) + δi > (14) + δˆi still holds.
Therefore, if j’s true valuation is the one that chooses
τˆ as the optimal allocation, then j would misreport to
get allocation τ which gives her a higher utility.
2. If δi < δˆi, we can easily modify vˆj(τˆ , p
τˆ ) such that
(12) + δi < (14) + δˆi but (12) > (14) still holds. In
this case, if j’s true valuation again is the one just
modified, j would misreport to get allocation τˆ with a
better utility.
In both of the above situations, agent j is incentivized to
misreport, which contradicts that (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truth-
ful. Thus, vi has to be multilinear in PoS.
It is worth mentioning that Theorem 2 does not say that
given a specific type profile θ, all vi have to be multilinear in
PoS for (pi∗, xPEV ) to be ex-post truthful. Take the delivery
example from Table 1 and change agent 2’s valuation for τ
to be v2(τ, p
τ ) = (pτ1)
2 × pτ2 which is not multilinear in
PoS. It is easy to check that under this change, no agent
can gain anything by misreporting if the other agent reports
truthfully. However, given each agent i of valuation vi, to
truthfully implement (pi∗, xPEV ) in an ex-post equilibrium
for all possible type profiles of the others, Theorem 2 says
that vi has to be multilinear in PoS, otherwise, there exist
settings where some agent is incentivized to misreport.
3.3 Conditions for Achieving Individual Ra-
tionality
PEV-based mechanism is individually rational in Porter et
al. [14]’s specific setting. However, in the general model
we consider here, it may not guarantee this property. For
example, there is an allocation where an agent has no task
to complete in an allocation, but has a negative valuation
for the completion of the tasks assigned to the others (i.e.
she is penalised if the others complete their tasks). If that
allocation is the optimal allocation and the allocation does
not change with or without that agent, then she will get a
zero payment therefore a negative utility.
Proposition 1 shows that by restricting agents’ valuations
to some typical constraint, PEV-based mechanism can be
made individually rational. The constraint says if an agent
is not involved in a task allocation (i.e., when the tasks as-
signed to her is empty), she will not be penalised by the
completion of the others’ tasks.
Proposition 1. Mechanism (pi∗, xPEV ) is individually ra-
tional if and only if for all i ∈ N , for all τ ∈ T , if τi = ∅,
then vi(τ, p
τ ) ≥ 0 for any pτ ∈ [0, 1]N .
Proof. (If part) For all type profile θ ∈ Θ, for all i ∈
N , let τ = pi∗(θ) and τˆ = pi∗(θ−i), i’s utility is given by∑
k∈N vk(τ, p
τ )−∑k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , pτˆ−i), where the first term
is the optimal social welfare with i’s participation and the
second term is the optimal social welfare without i’s partic-
ipation. It is clear that τˆi = ∅ as τˆ is the optimal allocation
without i’s participation.
∑
k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , p
τˆ
−i) + vi(τˆ , p
τˆ ) is
the social welfare for allocation τˆ . Since τ is optimal, we
get that
∑
k∈N vk(τ, p
τ ) ≥ ∑k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , pτˆ−i) + vi(τˆ , pτˆ ).
Thus,
∑
k∈N vk(τ, p
τ )−∑k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , pτˆ−i) ≥ vi(τˆ , pτˆ ) ≥ 0,
i.e. i’s utility is non-negative.
(Only if part) If there exist an i of type θi, a τ , a p
τ ∈
[0, 1]N such that τi = ∅ and vi(τ, pτ ) < 0. We can always
find a profile θˆ−i s.t. pˆτ = pτ and pi∗(θi, θˆ−i) = pi∗(θˆ−i) = τ .
It is clear that the payment for i is 0 and her utility is
vi(τ, p
τ ) < 0 (violates individual rationality).
4. EXTENSION TO TRUST-BASED ENVI-
RONMENTS
So far, we have assumed that each agent can correctly pre-
dict her probability of success (PoS) for each task, but in
some environments, an agent’s PoS is not perfectly perceived
by the agent alone. Instead, multiple other agents may have
had prior experiences with a given agent and their experi-
ences can be aggregated to create a more informed measure
of the PoS for the given agent. This measure is termed the
trust in the agent [15]. Ramchurn et al. have extended
Porter et al.’s mechanism to consider agents’ trust informa-
tion and showed that the extension is still truthfully imple-
mentable in their settings.
Similarly, our general model can also be extended to han-
dle the trust information by changing singleton pτi to be a
vector pτi = (p
τ
i,1, ..., p
τ
i,j , ..., p
τ
i,n) where p
τ
i,j is the proba-
bility that i believes j will complete j’s tasks in τ . Agent
i’s aggregated/true PoS for task τ is given by a function
fτi : [0, 1]
N → [0, 1] with input (pτ1,i, ..., pτn,i). Given this
extension, for any type profile θ, let ρτi = f
τ
i (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i),
the social welfare of a task allocation τ is defined as:∑
i∈N
vi(τ, ρ
τ ) (16)
where ρτ = (ρτ1 , ..., ρ
τ
n).
As shown in [15], the PEV-based mechanism can be ex-
tended to handle this trust information by simply updating
the efficient allocation choice function pi∗ with the social
welfare calculation given by Equation (16). Let us call the
extended mechanismMtrust. Ramchurn et al. have demon-
strated thatMtrust is ex-post truthful in their settings when
the PoS aggregation function is the following linear form:
fτi (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i) =
∑
j∈N
ωj × pτj,i (17)
where constant ωj ∈ [0, 1] and ∑j∈N ωj = 1.
Following the results in Theorems 1 and 2, we general-
ize Ramchurn et al.’s results to characterize all aggregation
forms under which Mtrust is ex-post truthful.
Definition 5. A PoS aggregation fi = (f
τ
i )τ∈T is mul-
tilinear if for all j ∈ N , for all τ ∈ T , for all θ ∈ Θ,
fτi (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
j,i, ..., p
τ
n,i) = p
τ
j,i×fτi (pτ1,i, ..., pτj−1,i, 1, pτj+1,i, ..., pτn,i)
+ (1− pτj,i)× fτi (pτ1,i, ..., pτj−1,i, 0, pτj+1,i, ..., pτn,i).
Definition 5 is similar to the multilinear in PoS definition
given by Definition 4. Multilinear aggregations cover the
linear form given by Equation (17), but also consist of many
non-linear forms such as
∏
j∈N p
τ
j,i. The following corollary
directly follows Theorems 1 and 2. We omit the proof here.
The basic idea of the proof is that given a multilinear func-
tion, if we substitute another multilinear function (with no
shared variables) for one variable of the function, then the
new function must be multilinear.
Corollary 1. Trust-based mechanismMtrust is ex-post
truthful if and only if for all i ∈ N , vi is multilinear in PoS,
and the PoS aggregation fi is multilinear.
ForMtrust to be individually rational, the constraint spec-
ified in Proposition 1 is still sufficient and necessary, if we
change h−i in the payment definition (Equation (2)) to be
the optimal social welfare that the others can achieve with-
out i, but assume that i offered the worst trust in the others
(see [15] for more details).
5. APPLYING PEV TO RIDESHARING
The literature has studied a few task allocation applica-
tions with execution uncertainty such as scheduling compu-
tational tasks to computing service providers or computing
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of the PoS for the given agent. This measure is termed the
trust in he ag nt [15]. Ramchurn et al. have xtende
Porter et al.’s mechanism to consider agents’ trust informa-
tion and showed that the extension is still truthfully imple-
mentable in their settings.
Similarly, our general model can also be extended to han-
dle the trust information by changing singleton pτi to be a
vector pτi = (p
τ
i,1, ..., p
τ
i,j , ..., p
τ
i,n) where p
τ
i,j is the proba-
bility that i believes j will complete j’s tasks in τ . Agent
i’s aggregated/true PoS for task τ is given by a function
fτi : [0, 1]
N → [0, 1] with input (pτ1,i, ..., pτn,i). Given this
extension, for any type profile θ, let ρτi = f
τ
i (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i),
the social welfare of a task allocation τ is defined as:∑
i∈N
vi(τ, ρ
τ ) (16)
where ρτ = (ρτ1 , ..., ρ
τ
n).
As shown in [15], the PEV-based mechanism can be ex-
tended to handle this trust information by simply updating
the eﬃcient allocation choice function π∗ with the social
welfare calculation given by Equation (16). Let us call the
extended mechanismMtrust. Ramchurn et al. have demon-
strated thatMtrust is ex-post truthful in their settings when
the PoS aggregation function is the following linear form:
fτi (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i) =
∑
j∈N
ωj × pτj,i (17)
where constant ωj ∈ [0, 1] and ∑j∈N ωj = 1.
Following the results in Theorems 1 and 2, we general-
ize Ramchurn et al.’s results to characterize all aggregation
forms under which Mtrust is ex-post truthful.
Definition 5. A PoS aggregation fi = (fi )τ∈T is mul-
tilinear if for all j ∈ N , for all τ ∈ T , for all θ ∈ Θ,
fτi (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
j,i, ..., p
τ
n,i) = p
τ
j,i×fτi (pτ1,i, ..., pτj−1,i, 1, pτj+1,i, ..., pτn,i)
+ (1− pτj,i)× fτi (pτ1,i, ..., pτj−1,i, 0, pτj+1,i, ..., pτn,i).
Definition 5 is similar to the multilinear in PoS definition
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Corollary 1. Trust-based mechanism Mtrust is ex-post
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and the PoS aggregation fi is multilinear.
ForMtrust to be individually r tional, the constraint spec-
ified in Proposition 1 is still suﬃcient and necessary, if we
change h−i in the payment definition (Equation (2)) to be
the optimal social welfare that the others can achieve with-
out i, but assume that i oﬀered the worst trust in the others
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5. APPLYING PEV TO RIDESHARING
The literature has studied a few task allocation applica-
tions with execution uncertainty such as scheduling compu-
tational tasks to computing service providers or computing
A
B
C10km
4km 8km
Bob: (A→ C, drive, cost : 15)
Tom: (A→ C, drive, cost : 10)
Alice: (B → C, taxi, cost : 20)
Allocation space T :
τ 1 = ({Bob}, {Tom}, {Alice})
τ 2 = ({Bob(drive), T om}, {Alice})
τ 3 = ({Bob, T om(drive)}, {Alice})
τ 4 = ({Bob}, {Tom,Alice})
τ 5 = ({Bob,Alice}, {Tom})
Figure 2: Ridesharing example
machines [18, 4]. In this section, we consider a ridesharing
application such as Uber and Lyft in the increasingly impor-
tant sharing economy, where the valuation setting has not
been considered with execution uncertainty yet. The princi-
ple of ridesharing is to eﬃciently utilise the extra seats avail-
able in commuters’ cars and therefore to reduce the number
of cars on the road, travel costs and CO2 emissions. How-
ever, existing ridesharing services such as Uber mainly allow
professional drivers to share their cars, and these services are
essentially not diﬀerent from taxi services and even pull out
more cars on the road (create more congestions).
To incentivise the whole community, not just professional
drivers, to eﬃciently share their cars, it is essential to suﬃ-
ciently evaluate the quality of the sharing services oﬀered by
individuals, and to establish a proper trust mechanism in the
community2. Execution uncertainty is likely to have a strong
impact on service quality. Following the above theoretical
results, in what follows, we show how execution uncertainty
can be modelled to increase service quality in ridesharing
and how trust can be further incorporated.
We consider a ridesharing setting where there are multi-
ple commuters, each of whom has a trip to finish via driving
or taking other form of transport. Each commuter’s trip
is modelled by departure/arrival locations, travel time win-
dow, travel costs and etc (see [19] for an example). For the
sake of clarity, we consider a simple ridesharing setting given
in Figure 2. There are three commuters, Bob, Tom and Al-
ice, who are planning a travel to attend a party at location
C. Both Bob and Tom depart from location A and plan to
drive with diﬀerent costs, while Alice departs from location
B and plans to take a taxi with a cost of 20 (the costs are
based on the shortest route to finish their trips). Assume
that they are flexible about their travel time, but all of them
have to arrive at location C before the party starts. We fur-
ther assume that both Bob and Tom have one extra seat in
their cars that can be shared to others. We then get the
sharing allocation space T presented in Figure 2 (people in
one set share(s) a car).
For each task allocation τ ∈ T , commuter i’s probability
of success (PoS) pτi is the probability that i will finish the
trip and attend the party (without sharing). It is natural to
2For example, Maramoja provides ridesharing/taxi services
in Nairobi and relies on trust metrics to guarantee rid-
ers/drivers successful trips.
Fig r : i s aring example
machines [18, 4]. I ion, we consider a ridesharing
a plication such as yft in the increasingly impor-
tant sharing econo y, here the valuation setting has not
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ice, who are planning a travel to attend a party at location
C. Both Bob and Tom depart from location A and plan to
drive with different costs, while Alice departs from location
B and plans to take a taxi with a cost of 20 (the costs are
based on the shortest route to finish their trips). Assume
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have to arrive at loca ion C before the party start . We fur-
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vb vt va
τ1 0 0 0
τ2 −α× pb × pt 10× pb × pt 0
τ3 (15− α)× pb × pt 0 0
τ4 −β × pt × pa (−2 + γ × pa)× pt 20× pa × pt
τ5 (−3 + δ × pa)× pb 0 20× pa × pb
Table 2: A valuation setting for the exmaple in Fig-
ure 2, where parameters α, β, γ, δ > 0.
trip and attend the party (without sharing). It is natural to
assume that a commuter’s intention to attend the party is
the same among all sharing allocations, and let pb, pt and
pa be the PoS of Bob, Tom and Alice respectively.
We define their valuations vb, vt, va for Bob, Tom and Al-
ice respectively according to Table 2. The basic intuition
behind the valuation setting is that if a commuter takes a
ride offered by others, then she will save her original trip
cost (i.e., her valuation is positive), while if she offers a ride
to others, then she will incur a detour cost if there is any
(i.e., her valuation is negative). The detour costs for Bob
and Tom to offer a ride to Alice are 15 × 0.2 and 10 × 0.2
respectively (as they travel 20% more than their shortest
trip). In addition, commuters may have externalities. In
this example, Bob has a higher preference to offer a ride to
Alice than to Tom, and would prefer that Tom and Alice do
not travel together (because, e.g., Bob is afraid of that Alice
might discuss their joint business ideas with Tom). Bob gets
a positive value δ if he shares with Alice, while receives a
negative value −α to share with Tom. Bob also gets a neg-
ative value −β if Tom shares with Alice. Tom also prefers
Alice to Bob, but Alice has no preference between Bob and
Tom. This valuation setting makes previous work insuffi-
cient, because there are externalities and there is no cost for
a commuter to not execute her trip.
Without loss of generality, assume that Bob, Tom and
Alice are all certain about attending the party, i.e., pb = pt =
pa = 1. Then, their valuations are simplified to be those in
Table 3. Assume that τ5 is the only efficient allocation and
τ4 is the second best, i.e., 17 + δ > 18 − β + γ > 15 − α.
Applying the PEV-based mechanism, the payment for Bob
is the following (according to Equation (2)):
xPEVb =
{
(18 + γ)− 20 if Bob attended,
(18 + γ)− 0 if Bob didn’t attend.
where 18 + γ is the social welfare that Tom and Alice can
achieve without Bob (allocation τ4), and 20 is the cost that
Bob saved for Alice (allocation τ5) if Bob attended the party
(i.e., Bob finished his trip). The payment indicates that Bob
will receive a reward −(γ − 2) if he attends the party, while
he will pay a penalty of 18 + δ if he fails to attend. Thus,
Bob’s utility is ub = ((−3 + δ)− (γ − 2))× pb + (0− (18 +
γ)) × (1 − pb) = δ − γ − 1. Notice that Bob’s utility might
be negative because he is unhappy if Tom and Alice share
together (see Proposition 1 for more details).
In what follows, we further consider how trust between
Bob, Tom and Alice can be incorporated in the above rideshar-
ing allocation. Apart from the probability of success pb, pt, pa
they have predicated for themselves, each of them also holds
a measure of trust about how likely the others will attend
the party (according to their past social experiences with
each other). Then each commuter’s final probability of at-
vb vt va
τ1 0 0 0
τ2 −α 10 0
τ3 15− α 0 0
τ4 −β −2 + γ 20
τ5 −3 + δ 0 20
Table 3: A valuation setting of Table 2 given pb =
pt = pa = 1.
tending the party is aggregated from all commuters’ pred-
ications (see Section 4 for the detailed model). We have
assumed that all of them are certain about their own trips,
i.e., pb = pt = pa = 1. However, Tom and Alice do not
trust Bob, i.e., Tom and Alice believe that Bob may not
attend the party in the end according to their experiences.
If Bob’s true probability of attending the party is averaged
from all commuters’ opinion, then Bob’s probability of at-
tending the party is pˆb < 1. Assume the other trust values
are all one, i.e., the aggregated PoSs of Tom and Alice are
both one. Then the social welfare of allocation τ5 under
trust is (17 + δ)pˆb. If (17 + δ)pˆb is less than 18− β + γ (the
social welfare of allocation τ4), Bob will not be allocated
to share with Alice, which is different from what we had
without considering trust in the above.
It is worth mentioning that in a complex ridesharing set-
ting, a driver may take more than one rider and a rider
may transfer between drivers to reach her destination. It
is often quite challenging to compute an efficient allocation
in a complex setting with many commuters, even without
considering execution uncertainty and trust. To tackle this
computational challenge, we may limit the allocation space
by, for example, limiting the number of people can share
in one car (e.g., UberPool only considers at most two pas-
sengers to share an Uber taxi) and limiting the number of
transfers for a rider to get to her destination (e.g., no exist-
ing ridesharing service has considered transfer/multi-hop).
Searching an optimal allocation under the limited allocation
space will be a lot easier and more importantly the truth-
fulness property still holds [12].
Apart from ridesharing, there are many other sharing econ-
omy business models where execution uncertainty is un-
avoidable. For instance, in the knowledge sharing sector
such as Freelancer.com, freelancers cannot always guarantee
the completion of the tasks assigned to them and therefore
rating/trust mechanism has been established to help em-
ployers to find the right freelancers for their tasks. In Free-
lancer.com, when an employer posts tasks, many freelancers
will bid for the tasks with different completion speeds and
costs. Some freelancers have good experiences (e.g., high
completion rate and high employer rating) and some do not.
Therefore, the employer faces the challenge of finding the
best set of freelancers among all the bidders, which fits per-
fectly to the problem setting of this paper.
6. WHEN PEV IS NOT AVAILABLE
We have characterised and bounded the applicability of the
post-execution verification (PEV)-based mechanism and its
extension with trust in a general task allocation setting,
and have further demonstrated its applicability in the real-
world. The key feature of the PEV-based mechanism is that
the mechanism can verify whether an agent has successfully
completed the tasks assigned to her and pays her accord-
ingly, which is feasible in many task allocation domains.
However, when post-execution verification is not available,
the problem that arises requires the design of an efficient
mechanism in a general interdependent valuation setting,
where the interdependence comes from agents’ execution un-
certainty. Under a general interdependent valuation setting,
Jehiel and Moldovanu [6] have demonstrated the difficulty
of designing an efficient and Bayes-Nash truthful3 mecha-
nism (see also [9, 3]). They have proved a general impos-
sibility and further identified a necessary condition for im-
plementing an efficient and Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism
(see Proposition 2). In the rest, we show how to model
the task allocation problem as a general interdependent val-
uation setting and draw the implication of the necessary
condition in the task allocation domain.
We first briefly introduce the general interdependent val-
uation setting based on [6, 3] and then show how to fit the
task allocation problem to the general setting. The general
interdependent valuation setting is the following:
• There areK social alternatives/outcomes andN agents.
• Each agent i has a (private) type (called signal) si
drawn from a space Si ⊆ RK×N according to a con-
tinuous density function fi(si) > 0 and fi is common
knowledge. Coordinate ski,j of si influences the valua-
tion of agent j in alternative k.
• One alternative k will be chosen, and i’s valuation for
k is defined as:
vki (s
k
1,i, ..., s
k
n,i) =
∑
j∈N
αkj,i × skj,i (18)
where parameters αkj,i ≥ 0 are common knowledge.
It is evident that the interdependence between agents’ val-
uations is caused by their private signals si, which is their
probability of success in our task allocation setting.
The task allocation problem can be modelled as the above
with the following setup:
• Let K = T , for all k ∈ K, ski,j = pki for all j ∈ N ,
where pki (i’s PoS for k) is drawn from [0, 1] with a
density function f4. That is, there is only one signal
from i for each k, which is i’s PoS for k.
• Applying (18), i’s valuation for allocation k is a linear
function of all PoSs pkj for all j ∈ N , and parame-
ter αki,j ≥ 0 represents the value that j will get if i
completes her tasks ki in k.
We can see that the above model can only model a very
small portion of our general task allocation, namely the set-
tings in which the tasks between agents are independent (due
to the linear form of their valuation functions) and also their
valuations become public5 (because parameters αki,j ≥ 0 are
public and not part of their type).
3Bayes-Nash truthful is weaker than ex-post truthful and it
assumes that all agents know the correct probabilistic dis-
tribution of each agent’s type.
4We can set f to be any random distribution, which is not
important in our model.
5Public valuation does not affect our results because the
main challenge in our setting is that their private PoS creates
valuation interdependencies.
Even under this limited task allocation setting, Jehiel
and Moldovanu [6] have showed that the following condition
(Equation (19)) has to hold for implementing an efficient
and Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism. We will discuss the
implication of the necessary condition in the task allocation
setting.
Proposition 2. [Theorem 4.3 in [6]] If there exists an
efficient and Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism, then the fol-
lowing must hold:
αkˆi,i
αki,i
=
∑
j∈N α
kˆ
i,j∑
j∈N α
k
i,j
(19)
for all i of type si, for all k 6= kˆ ∈ K, if αki,i 6= 0 and there
exist s−i 6= sˆ−i such that pi∗(si, s−i) = k and pi∗(si, sˆ−i) = kˆ
where pi∗ is an efficient allocation.
In our model, condition (19) says that the ratio of the
values that i gets from the completion of her own tasks in
two different allocations k, kˆ is equal to the ratio of the values
that i brings to all agents including herself. In other words,
if i prefers tasks ki to kˆi, then all agents together also prefer
ki to kˆi for i.
However, condition (19) is just one necessary condition
and we are not aware of any efficient and Bayes-Nash truth-
ful mechanism existing for the general interdependent valu-
ation setting (except for a very simple setting where agents’
signals are one-dimensional [6], in which case the efficient
and truthful mechanism actually follows the VCG logic).
From the above analysis, we see that without post-execution
verification, we can hardly design a truthful mechanism and
the necessary condition for designing a truthful mechanism
already restricts us to a very small portion of the whole
valuation space. With post-execution verification, we are
not restricted by the necessary condition (19). Our results
showed that the PEV-based mechanism is ex-post truthful
in the above general setting without any other condition,
because the valuation setting (Equation (18)) is risk-neutral
(multilinear in PoS) by definition.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We studied a general task allocation problem where multi-
ple agents collaboratively accomplish a set of tasks, but they
may fail to successfully complete tasks assigned to them. To
design an efficient task allocation mechanism for this prob-
lem, we showed that post-execution verification based mech-
anism is truthfully implementable, if and only if all agents
are risk-neutral with respect to their execution uncertainty.
We also showed that trust information between agents can
be integrated into the mechanism without violating its prop-
erties, if and only if the trust information is aggregated by a
multilinear function. It is the first time that this character-
isation and bound of the applicability of the post-execution
verification based mechanism is studied. We further demon-
strated the applicability of the mechanism in the real-world
and showed the significance of the post-execution verifica-
tion in the design. For future work, apart from investigating
other interesting applications of the PEV-based mechanism,
the results also indicate that we need to search different so-
lutions to handle settings where agents are not risk-neutral
(e.g., in ridesharing, a rider may not want to ride with a
driver who has high execution uncertainty for important
trips).
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